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Bail-in has become the favorite focal 
point, or rather the favorite provocative 
term in the policy debate about bank 
rescue programs in Europe. For instance, 
over the past few weeks, the German 
government has insistently requested a 
substantial participation of the private 
sector in any further debt restructuring. 
Others, like the President of the 
European Central Bank have vigorously 
opposed any step towards a true bail-in. 
Likewise, most European governments 
and some prominent economists have 
warned of the devastating consequences 
a spreading of default expectations 
would have on the financial stability of 
the European banking system.
Such warnings are not without reason. 
The gradual acceleration of the crisis 
over the past three years has left 
many financial institutions holding 
considerable amounts of once-high 
quality debt that has turned sour over 
time. The existing accounting system, 
however, has trapped these assets in 
the banks’ balance sheets. Selling 
downgraded debt is tantamount to 
realizing the accumulated losses – many 
banks can simply not afford to take the 
hit, given their rather meagre equity 
cushions. 
The Bail-in Puzzle
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The reason why many economists, and 
a few policy makers, keep on requesting 
bail-ins is their trust in the general 
concept of market discipline. A bail-in 
for private bond holders is the natural 
counterpart to risk premiums earned 
by bond holders over the expected life 
of the bond. A rise of the risk premium 
exerts healthy pressure on the debtor, as 
new funding becomes more difficult and 
more expensive. New bonds will have 
more stringent covenants, alerting bank 
management to reduce risk exposure. 
As funding costs adequately reflect bank 
risk, it is eventually the shareholder who 
is punished for excessive risk taking. The 
concept of market discipline is effective 
under normal market conditions, as 
witnessed by the influence rating 
agencies exert on the valuation of firms 
across many markets. 
Note that the healthy role of bond 
markets critically hinges upon strict 
bankruptcy enforcement, which serves 
to allocate losses to creditors by 
seniority. This is the simple mechanics 
of debt market corporate governance.
However, bank markets do not quite 
work as they should. Under the current 
conditions of a global financial crisis, 
notably in Europe’s banking industry, 
the governance role of bond markets 
is defunct. In fact, investors have 
understood that bank debt will almost 
always be rescued with taxpayers’ 
money. No wonder that CDS prices 
grossly underestimate true bank default 
risk for almost all major banks in Europe 
and the U.S., while no such inefficiency 
is found for non-bank firms. A recent 
study by two Goethe University 
doctoral students, Z. Tsesmelidakis and 
F. Schweikhard1 finds, for the crisis 
years until 2009, bank default risk to 
be underestimated by several hundred 
basis points. Their analysis is based on 
CDS prices.
The widespread practice of government-
led bank bail-outs has according to their 
findings severely corrupted the bond 
market, leading to the underestimation 
of risk.
Any feasible solution to the bank-
debt-is-too-cheap problem will have to 
re-install true default risk for bank bond 
holders. This is exactly the task of the 
restructuring laws that are currently 
introduced in several countries in 
Europe. Consider the new German 
restructuring law. It is designed to allow 
the supervisor to intervene when a bank 
threatens to trigger a banking crisis, 
creating a good bank and a bad bank 
over-night. The good bank will be fully 
protected by government money, while 
the bad bank will be liquidated and its 
creditors are likely to suffer big losses. 
The new restructuring law, a landmark 
legislation engineered in the middle 
of the biggest banking crisis in many 
decades, is effective January 1, 2011. 
This is the good news. The bad news 
is: we do not see any bail-ins. Why 
not? Furthermore, far from being hailed 
as the much-needed remedy, the term 
“bail-in” has become a good candidate 
for the non-word of the year, the most-
abhorred term in European politics. 
Why? 
The crux is evidently that bank creditors, 
who supposedly should expect to get 
a haircut during an imminent bank 
default, can confidently expect to be 
spared any haircut at all. The reason is 
that bank creditors way too often are 
banks themselves. A haircut would thus 
have disastrous consequences.
Thus, what is required to render the 
restructuring law workable is a certain 
minimum of bank bond holders that are 
permanently situated outside the banking 
system. Such bondholders are capable 
of absorbing losses (‘haircuts’) without 
simultaneously triggering a systemic 
banking default. I will call such bond 
holders haircut-able, as they are capable 
to break the vicious circle of bank 
systemic risk. 
Life-insurance companies and pension 
funds are the prototype haircut-able 
investors. Of course, these institutions 
do not like the idea of being haircut-
able, and will probably be very quick in 
selling any sort of “haircut-prone” assets 
in their portfolios, like bank bonds, 
whenever they see a banking crisis 
approaching. 
This brings me to the main policy 
proposal. In order to have bond 
holders carry the burden of a potential 
bank default, banks need a sufficient 
amount of truly defaultable debt, 
and a commensurately sized group of 
haircut-able debt holders. The required 
amendment to the restructuring laws in 
all countries is rather straightforward: 
banks must issue bonds, from which they 
– and any other institution within the 
core financial system – are barred from 
purchasing. Haircut-able institutions, 
like pension funds are supposed to buy 
and hold such haircut-prone bonds. The 
rate required to hold such debt will again 
be determined by the market – this time 
it will be high enough to compensate 
adequately for expected losses, as a 
government bail-out no longer can be 
taken for granted. 
As a result, curing the contagious disease 
of systemic banking risk in Europe, and 
similarly in the U.S., requires one new 
treatment, in addition to the measures 
already taken. This new medicine 
consists of an active involvement of 
long-term investors in bank funding. 
While defaultability may not taste all 
that well to bondholders, its attractive 
coupon will be a convincing sweetener, 
bringing the cost of bank debt back to 
its true level. 
Jan Pieter Krahnen (Director CFS)
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The paper presents a critical review of 
the role of inflation targeting, which 
was widely acclaimed as state-of-the-art 
monetary policy prior to the financial 
crisis and is still considered by many to be 
an optimal strategy.
For several years, central banks have 
embraced what Issing calls the “Jackson 
Hole Consensus”, namely that central 
banks should not target asset prices and 
not prick bubbles but should rather follow 
a “clean-up” strategy in the aftermath of 
events. In Issing’s view, this passive role 
together with the pre-announcement of 
the bank’s role as “savior” represents an 
asymmetric approach, one that might 
create moral hazard and contribute to 
even larger bubbles and collapses. Issing 
particularly points to two fundamental 
questions: First, can the emergence of 
a major bubble be identified? Second, 
what instruments are available to avoid 
the realization of a major bubble? On 
the last question, Issing doubts the 
common arguments that are used to 
justify why central banks should not lean 
against emerging bubbles. New research 
and empirical evidence have shown the 
potential effectiveness of the central bank 
interest rate to stabilize financial markets. 
The paper then lists a number of strong 
arguments in favor of “leaning against the 
wind” of asset price booms by using the 
interest rate. 
Issing continues by pointing to the neglect 
for many years of money and credit not 
only in academic research but also in 
a number of central banks. Monetary 
factors – in a broad sense – can be used 
for the analysis and forecasting of asset 
price developments. A central bank that 
monitors the development of money and 
credit and takes these factors into account 
when making monetary policy decisions, 
therefore implicitly applies a “leaning 
against the wind strategy” without having 
to identify the emergence of bubbles. The 
challenge is how to integrate asset price 
considerations into the monetary policy 
strategy. According to Issing, for inflation 
targeting this seems very hard to do, as 
it is based on a forecast using models in 
which monetary factors do not play an 
active role.
Despite the fact that monetary factors are 
and will remain an alien element in inflation 
targeting, the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy gave a prominent role to “Money” 
from the beginning. The fundamental 
question is which role money and credit 
should play in a monetary policy strategy 
designed to deliver price stability. Issing 
raises two points in this respect. Given 
that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, 
central banks need to take the relationship 
between monetary growth and inflation 
into account, when assessing risks to price 
stability. Moreover, monitoring monetary 
developments provides the basis for a 
medium-term orientation that pays tribute 
to substantial time lags and protects the 
central bank from the risk of destabilizing 
“activism”. At the same time, monitoring 
money and credit can create a “barrier” 
against major policy mistakes.
Finally Issing makes a case against increasing 
the central bank’s inflation target as a 
way to deal with the challenge from the 
“zero bound”. Besides the economic and 
social costs, this would also result in a 
loss of credibility of central banks after 
having successfully convinced the public 
and markets that low and stable inflation 
is essential. 
CFS Working Paper 
Lessons for Monetary Policy: What Should the Consensus Be? 
By Otmar Issing (CFS) 
		 The paper originally appeared in the 
IMF Working Paper series WP/11/97. 
The paper is also available on the CFS 
website.
Default Risk in an Interconnected Banking System with 
Endogenous Asset Markets 
By Marcel Bluhm and Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt and Center for Financial Studies
In a way that could not have been envisaged 
a few years ago, the global financial crisis, 
which began in 2007, has demonstrated 
how a system of interconnected financial 
institutions may be subject to a systemic 
breakdown, with large effects on the real 
economy. To investigate systemic risk, 
the authors develop a numerical model 
of interrelated bank balance sheets with 
endogenous asset markets. The model 
replicates the main stylized facts that 
came to light during the financial crisis 4
and allows the emergence of systemic 
risk, as well as the banks’ involvement, 
to be analyzed. They then introduce the 
concept of System Value at Risk (SVaR) 
and use the model to investigate the 
relation between a bank’s contribution 
to systemic risk and its optimal macro-
prudential capitalization.
There are several definitions of systemic 
risk. The Financial Stability Board, 
International Monetary Fund, and Bank 
for International Settlements describe 
systemic risk in a report to the G-20 as 
“a risk of disruption to financial services 
that is (i) caused by an impairment of all 
or parts of the financial system and (ii) 
has the potential to have serious negative 
consequences for the real economy”.
Adhering closely to this definition, 
the authors define systemic risk as the 
danger that failures within the financial 
system will mean that an adequate supply 
of credit and financial services to the 
economy is no longer guaranteed, so that 
negative real effects will follow.
A main driver of the recent financial 
crisis was the state of the financial system 
at the time. Highly leveraged, and to a 
large extent, homogeneous (with respect 
to their portfolio structure) financial 
institutions, encompassing both the 
banking as well as the shadow-banking 
system, with interconnected, mostly 
obscure balance sheets rendered the 
financial system fragile. Over the course 
of the crisis numerous institutions had 
to be bailed out because their insolvency 
would have put the financial system at 
risk by triggering a cascade of defaults in 
other financial institutions. The ensuing 
systemic risk was essentially driven by 
three factors: (i) size of the financial 
institutions as well as the (ii) direct and 
(iii) indirect interconnectedness between 
financial institutions. The authors’ model 
captures these important risk factors.
 
To mitigate the risk of future financial 
meltdowns, it is nowadays commonly 
accepted that, in addition to micro-
prudential supervision, supervisors need 
to set up an additional layer of macro-
prudential regulation and supervision that 
will allow system-wide risk drivers to 
be identified, and systemic risk to be 
monitored, thus making it possible to 
react in an adequate manner. Systemic 
risk is a negative externality of financial 
institutions on the financial system. 
When they potentially face no charges 
for this negative externality, financial 
institutions are provided with an incentive 
to increase their contribution to systemic 
risk by becoming too-big-to-fail or too-
interconnected-to-fail because it allows 
them to take advantage of the resulting 
cheap refinancing opportunities. 
A macro-prudential risk management 
approach should, therefore, feature two 
specific characteristics. First, it should 
insure that even when faced with strongly 
adverse shocks a viable part of the 
financial system remains solvent. Second, 
banks should be incentivized to lower 
their contribution to systemic risk. This 
can be implemented via charging them 
a levy according to their contribution 
to systemic risk. In the proposed SVaR 
concept a Pigouvian tax is used to 
capitalize a systemic risk fund and the 
capital from the systemic risk fund is 
re-injected into the financial system to 
make it more resilient to systemic risk. 
The optimal amount of capital for the 
systemic risk fund as well as the necessary 
proportions of capital to be injected into 
financial institutions are determined 
using a parallelized simulated annealing 
approach.
The paper provides evidence that from 
a macro-prudential risk management 
perspective a bank’s contribution to 
systemic risk is not necessarily a sufficient 
determinant of its optimal macro-
prudential capitalization. The analysis has 
important implications for the design 
of optimal bank levies. In particular, if 
a Pigouvian approach is adopted – in 
which banks are charged according to 
their contribution to systemic risk – in 
order to achieve a target level of financial 
stability, careful distinction must be made 
between (i) the channels that affect banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk and (ii) the 
extent to which the instrument chosen to 
achieve the target affects these channels. 
Constraining the instrument to be 
perfectly correlated with a given measure 
of banks’ contribution to systemic risk can 
result in sub-optimal capital allocations.
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		 The paper will soon appear in the 
CFS Working Paper series
From September 2011 onwards Marcel Bluhm will work as Assistant Professor at the Wang Yanan Institute for 
Studies in Economics (WISE) at Xiamen University (XMU), in Fujian Province, China. The WISE is a research 
center which has been founded in 2005 to, inter alia, enhance the curriculum in economic studies at XMU, excel in 
research and nurture a team of young economists and econometricians with academic leadership, taking up a think 
tank role, and establishing itself as an influential regional center in Asia-Pacific for international academic exchange 
in economics and finance. In his new position, Marcel Bluhm will do research in macroeconometrics and finance, give courses in 
macroeconomics and econometrics, and act as intermediary to European universities and research institutes.5
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CFS White Paper
No. IX - On a Fundamental Reorganization of the Landesbanken 
and the Savings Banks Sector in Germany 
By Heinz Hilgert (former chief executive   WestLB), Jan Krahnen (CFS), Günter Merl (former chief executive Helaba) and Helmut Siekmann (IMFS) 
The objective behind this white paper is to 
initiate an open and critical public debate 
on the savings banks and Landesbanken 
(regional state bank) sector in Germany. 
Given the political disarray surrounding 
the bail-out of the Landesbanken as 
well as the conflicts of interest between 
policies at the local, state, and federal 
level and European competition policy, 
such a debate is long overdue. Moreover, 
there is currently a dearth of suggestions 
proposing a viable structure for this 
key component of the German financial 
sector. This article summarizes the ideas 
presented in the paper.
The situation of the Landesbanken today 
gives much cause for concern: structural 
changes imposed by Brussels have not 
yet been implemented, the savings banks 
and the German state want to withdraw 
from their ownership role and there are 
substantial burdens deriving from recent 
regulatory changes. Furthermore, the 
Landesbanken have no viable business 
model and whilst at first glance, the 
savings banks themselves appear stable, 
they are to a large extent (through 
direct ownership and a high level of 
outstanding claims) interconnected with 
the Landesbanken. This could easily lead 
to a loss of confidence in the savings 
banks. Under the current joint liability 
scheme, Landesbanken and savings banks 
are liable for one another. Following the 
abolition of the state guarantees, the 
quality and economic performance of 
this protection scheme no longer meets 
the requirements for bailing out even a 
single larger Landesbank. 
At present, the Landesbanken and 
savings banks pose a serious financial 
risk to the German state. The authors 
argue that the current economic 
situation affords an opportunity for 
undertaking the structural reforms 
necessary to achieving sustained stability 
and improved competitiveness within 
the German financial industry. 
Several considerations lead the authors 
to conclude that the debate on reform 
must focus on the entire Landesbanken 
and savings banks sector. In the authors’ 
view, a form of verticalization is 
necessary for restructuring the sector.
The authors develop a new structural 
model that they refer to as ‘tripartite 
model’ since it gives rise to three types 
of financial institutions alongside which 
the traditional municipal savings banks 
would continue to exist. Dekabank 
and the Landesbanken would be either 
wholly or partly assimilated by the three 
components. The graph below gives a 
view of the new structure.
A detailed description of each com-
ponent can be found in the paper. By 
way of example, an existing Landesbank 
would be split and reassigned. The retail 
business would be integrated in one of the 
regionally integrated savings banks (SRIs). 
At the same time, any joint business will 
be incorporated into the national financial 
service institution (SZI). All unsustainable 
business segments, for which integration 
in the SRI or SZI is not viable, are to be 
phased out or transferred to the state 
investment banks (Landesförderbanken 
– LFB). The liability for the wind-down 
facility of the Landesbanken must be 
carried by the post-owners of the former 
Landesbank. The savings banks will have 
the option to join the regional institutions. 
The ownership of the new units will 
be divided between municipalities and 
municipal associations (for SRIs), savings 
banks and savings banks associations (for 
SZI) as well as the federal states (for LFB).
The authors expect the proposed 
reforms to provide a strong boost to 
financial competition in Germany. They 
call for the establishment of a govern-
ment commission with a corresponding 
mandate to develop a proposal for the 
whole sector.
SRIs
Formed from:
Merger of Landesbank segments with 
metropolitan area savings banks
Functions:
• Retail banking, mid- and large caps
•   Project financing and capital markt 
business (client focussed)
•   Municipal and real estate financing 
business
Owners:
Municipalities and municipal 
associations
SZI
Formed from:
Integration of DekaBank, LBS, Landes-
bank segments, insurance companies
Functions:
Verbundbusiness for SRIs and non-SRI-
integrated savings banks
Owners:
Holding owned by savings banks and 
savings banks associations
LFBs
Functions:
Development activities 
under “Agreement II“, if 
necessary also for wind-
down, dissolution, sale of 
non-sustainable segments 
of Landesbanks (e.g. 
agency within an agency)
Owners:
Federal States, but liability 
for legacies in keeping with 
ownership structures of the 
(former) Landesbank
Savings banks Non-SRI-integrated savings banks
Functions: Retail/private banking, SMEs
Owners: Municipalities6
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No. XIII - Getting Greece Back on Track: How?1 
By Michael Haliassos (CFS) and Dimitri  Vayanos (London School of Economics) 
The memorandum that Greece has 
signed with the ECB-EU-IMF “troika” in 
May 2010 mainly contains proposals for 
market liberalization (with an emphasis 
on labor and product markets and 
little on financial reforms). The authors 
however believe that these should be 
complemented by deep structural 
reforms in two other key areas, namely 
the legal system and the public sector. In 
the absence of structural and long-term 
reforms, Greece will not be able to exit 
the crisis, and the austerity measures 
implemented so far will not bear fruit. 
The troika should catalyze these reforms 
by providing pressure and technical 
assistance. While such engagement 
is costly and time-consuming, the 
alternative is much costlier: Greece 
will experience a deep and prolonged 
recession as well as significant social 
unrest, and the huge sums lent to it will 
be lost.
Market Liberalization and 
Regulatory Bodies
Market liberalization 
in Greece has received 
considerable attention 
recently, both in relation 
to the labor market and 
to the market for goods and services. 
Markets in Greece are heavily regulated: 
in 2008, for example, Greece’s market 
for goods and services was the most 
heavily regulated in the OECD. The 
OECD has estimated that proper 
deregulation – by abolishing inefficient 
regulations and enforcing rigorously the 
few that matter – can raise Greece’s 
GDP by more than 15%. Such estimates 
indicate that the Greek economy has 
huge growth potential. Some measures 
to liberalize markets have been legislated 
recently under the troika’s pressure. 
In some cases, however, the changes 
have been only marginal because the 
government has yielded to lobbying 
pressure by incumbents.
The main changes that are needed in the 
labor market are to reduce firing costs 
and to facilitate firm-level agreements, 
and this to a greater extent than already 
realized. The liberalization of the labor 
market should be accompanied by 
better insurance and training for the 
unemployed, areas in which Greece lags 
significantly behind its EU partners. 
The main change that is needed in the 
market for goods and services is the 
abolition of all obstacles to competition, 
such as minimum fees and geographical 
restrictions. This change will reduce 
production costs and will raise 
productivity and households’ incomes. 
Effective competition also requires 
strong and independent regulatory 
bodies to prevent any monopoly 
practices. Greek regulatory bodies have 
become more effective recently. Their 
independence from the state, however, 
should be strengthened even further. 
The presence of strong, independent 
regulatory bodies is especially important 
in light of the upcoming privatizations. 
Market reform should also concern 
Greece’s financial system. One of the 
main causes of Greece’s current recession 
is a credit crunch: Greek firms are having 
difficulty to borrow from banks because 
the latter are experiencing funding 
constraints. These constraints are partly 
due to the sovereign debt crisis, which 
has caused a flight of deposits away from 
Greek banks and uncertainty about the 
value of Greek government bonds that 
banks are holding in their portfolio. The 
constraints are also due, however, to 
choices made by Greek banks, such as 
the large credit expansion in an unstable 
macro-economic environment and the 
investment of an overly large fraction 
of their portfolio in Greek government 
bonds. These problems are partly due 
to the close relationship between banks 
and the state, which hinders the effective 
supervision of banks by the relevant 
regulatory bodies. Reform in the 
banking system requires making it truly 
independent of the government. Entry 
by foreign strategic investors in some 
banks, at least on a temporary basis, 
could be useful in that respect.
Greek firms could, in principle, also 
raise capital from the stock market. 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of interest 
by investors in the stock market, which 
1    This article is based on a talk that the authors gave at the 15th Economist Roundtable with the Government of Greece. With thanks to Costas Meghir, Elias 
Papaioannou and Nikos Vettas for useful comments and suggestions.
The economic crisis in Greece is not a simple consequence of the recent global financial crisis, but is due 
to deep structural problems of the Greek economy that have accumulated over decades. Consequently, the 
solution to the crisis consists in a series of structural reforms that will take years. The goal of these reforms 
is to raise productivity, both in the private and public sector. The increase in productivity is necessary to 
stem the rapid drop of incomes of Greek households, and to maintain Greece’s status as a relatively rich 
country. 7
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is to a large extent a rational reaction 
to the large number of fraud incidents 
during the stock-market bubble of 2000. 
Very few of these incidents have been 
prosecuted successfully then, due to 
deficiencies in the legal system.
Justice System
Reform of the justice 
system has not been high 
up on the agenda of either 
the Greek government or 
the troika; yet, it is one of the most 
powerful growth-promoting reforms 
that could be undertaken over the next 
few years. An efficient justice system will 
lead to fewer incidents of corruption, 
which discourage entrepreneurial 
activity, impede the efficient functioning 
of the state, and poison citizens’ trust 
towards it. 
The performance of the Greek justice 
system is poor and can be improved 
significantly. According to the World 
Bank’s 2011 Doing Business report, 
Greece ranked 151st among 183 
countries according to the time it takes 
to try a civil case – this time exceeds 
the average time in countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. Under these conditions, 
Greece will be unable to attract foreign 
investment or reduce corruption, which 
according to Transparency International 
is highest in Greece among all 27 EU 
countries.
Improving the justice system requires 
reforms on many fronts. For example, 
the discretion of judges to grant 
postponements must be limited. The 
Greek state, which often delays its financial 
obligations towards private parties by 
seeking postponements even after a final 
verdict has been reached, should comply 
instantly with courts’ decisions. Courts 
should also be computerized, a process 
that has recently taken place in Algeria, 
Botswana, etc. but is still delayed in 
Greece. The performance of each court 
should be measured and compared 
to that of other courts. The issue of 
measuring productivity and efficiency, 
however, is a broader issue concerning 
the public sector. 
Productivity in the 
Public Sector
The public sector needs 
to be transformed from 
an institution hiring party 
supporters in exchange 
for votes to an efficient provider of 
services to  society. The authors consider 
this to be feasible only in conjunction 
with the provision of incentives for 
promoting and rewarding productivity. 
The big challenge is to provide such 
incentives in a period that requires 
severe cuts in government expenditures.
Much of the current public debate 
focuses on the need for spending cuts. 
However, repeated wage cuts without 
reference to productivity discourage and 
ultimately push away the most dynamic 
public employees. Therefore, the 
discouraging message of wage reductions 
must be complemented with a positive 
perspective, such as promotions and wage 
increases strictly linked to productivity. 
Funding of public institutions should be 
related to quantity but especially quality 
of their output, using as benchmarks 
relevant international indices and best 
practices. Evaluation of schools, for 
example, may take into account PISA or 
university entrance exam results. That 
of public corporations can be based 
on cost and quality of services, etc. 
Non-performing agencies should have 
their managers replaced, or should be 
merged, abolished, or passed over to the 
private sector.
The crucial question is who is going 
to evaluate performance beyond the 
shadow of a doubt, so as to reward 
the most productive employees and to 
identify the problem cases. How can 
this be done when there are pockets of 
corruption and long-standing practices 
of promoting political allies? Here the 
authors rely on two principles. 
One can be described as a ‘transplant’ 
to Greece of international practices 
promoting meritocracy and trust. For 
the adoption of performance indicators, 
we can rely, in some cases, on existing 
international evaluation agencies, whose 
reputation depends on their impartiality 
and adherence to high standards (e.g., 
accreditation agencies for educational 
institutions or programs). Further, there 
are foreign scientists and businessmen 
or Greeks living abroad who show 
genuine interest to transfer international 
experiences and best practices. 
The other is based on the alignment of 
interests of evaluators and of those being 
evaluated, with a focus on promoting 
productivity. The criteria for evaluating 
individuals can be applied by senior 
managers of public sector agencies, 
provided that they are themselves 
evaluated on the basis of international 
standards. The efficiency of advisory 
committees, which should be flexible and 
limited to a minimum, should be assessed 
by the Government on the basis of their 
observed contribution to promoting 
productivity and competitiveness. In 
this way, the incentives of employees, 
management, and advisory committees 
are aligned to a maximum degree and 
are focused on efficiency. This proposal 
can extend the role of the public sector 
to be a catalyst for change. The authors 
call it a ‘transplant’ because it can spread 
a culture of meritocracy and efficiency 
throughout the Greek public sector and 
this will in turn result in less need for 
involvement of outsiders in the future.8
Research and Policy | CFS Publications
Do Greeks Respond 
to Incentives?
Can these objectives be accomplished? 
Do Greeks respond to incentives or 
are they doomed to wasteful spending, 
low productivity, and corruption? More 
generally, is Europe divided into two 
groups of countries, one of ‘high flyers’ in 
which meritocracy and productivity can 
flourish, and another one of ‘laggards’ 
condemned to permanent misery and 
corruption? Very often, such strange 
views are voiced in public discourse.
The authors consider the ‘genetic 
theory’ of Europe very dubious. Another 
widespread wrong perception outside 
Greece is that, because the Greek public 
sector is over-indebted, the same applies 
to Greek households, and that the latter 
exhibit over-spending and excessive risk 
taking. This perception is not valid, as a 
recent study has shown.2 If one examines 
net household wealth (i.e., all assets 
minus loans of all forms, even from 
friends and family) of Greek households 
aged 50 or more, one finds that its level 
at the lower 25th percentile of the 2004 
distribution was bigger than that of the 
U.S., five times that of Germany, and 
close to France. Median net household 
wealth was comparable to that in Austria 
and larger than in Germany. At a time 
when U.S. households were accumulating 
mortgages, older households in reckless 
and over-indebted Greece had the 
smallest participation rate in mortgages 
for their primary residence among all 
developed European countries the study 
considered (5.5%) despite exhibiting 
the second largest homeownership rate 
after Spain. This outlook has a lot to do 
with the priority attached by Greeks 
to acquiring and bequeathing homes 
and other real estate. Since the burst 
of the stock market bubble in 2000, 
Greeks exhibit one of the smallest 
stock market participation rates. It is 
thus particularly surprising that Greeks 
managed to combine consistency in the 
management of their own assets, with 
complete neglect of state finances.
A credible and drastic change, with 
institutional reforms consistent 
with international best practices, can 
restore the lost confidence. This effort 
can succeed only if financially strong 
European countries support it, not 
only with funding, tough conditions 
and penalties, but also with transfer 
of internationally recognized practices 
and relevant experience, and above 
all with confidence in the ability of 
their ailing partners to perform under 
a healthy institutional and economic 
environment. What is needed most, 
though, is for Greeks themselves to 
believe in their future. It is here that 
the media and the level of the political 
discourse play a decisive role. It is crucial 
for the investment and social climate 
that attention be shifted, from the few 
who lose to the many that stand to 
gain from a more competitive economy. 
Only then can we hope that Greeks 
will channel their resourcefulness away 
from aggressive protests, and towards 
the discovery of new paths to growth and 
economic well-being.
		 Both White Papers can be 
downloaded from the CFS Website 
or the House of Finance Policy 
Platform  
2   Christelis, Dimitris, Georgarakos, Dimitris, Haliassos, Michael “Differences in Portfolios Across Countries: Economic Environment versus Household Characteristics”9
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Eurobonds and European Policy Coordination: 
The View from the German Financial Sector 
Michael Haliassos, Christian Knoll, and Jan Krahnen (CFS)
In this note, the authors make use of 
recent survey data to shed more light 
on the views of the German financial 
sector on Eurobonds. Although the 
German government has taken a rather 
strong stance against the issuance of such 
bonds, Eurobonds are currently being 
debated as a potential solution to the 
financing problems of some European 
countries with fiscal imbalances. If 
they are to be successful, Eurobonds 
require considerable harmonization of 
EU government fiscal and labor market 
policies. 
The authors try to uncover systematic 
patterns in the responses of top managers 
of the financial sector and policy makers 
in Germany. The panelists were asked to 
distinguish between their expectations 
and their own personal preferences on 
a number of issues, such as the issuance 
of Eurobonds and the coordination of 
tax, labor and budgetary policies in the 
European Union. 
The findings show that the German 
financial community does not expect 
the euro crisis to be over soon. This is 
quite consistent with the prevailing high 
spreads on long-term yields of troubled 
euro countries. 
The majority also expects that a common 
bond will be issued by the euro area in 
2011, even if four out of five respondents 
state that they oppose the issuance 
of Eurobonds. Despite this dislike, a 
majority of panelists regard fiscal and 
labor market policy coordination and 
harmonization (in addition to the 
already achieved monetary policy 
harmonization) as necessary within 
Europe. Many however are not very 
optimistic about the chances that such 
coordination will be successful. 
In order to better understand this survey, 
the authors run a regression using the 
stated expectations on Eurobonds and 
harmonization. Interestingly, expecting 
Eurobonds is not systematically related 
to any expectations about a move to 
coordinate fiscal and labor market 
policy in the euro area. Eurobonds are 
being perceived as a political necessity 
rather than an outcome of a policy 
harmonization process. 
In a second run, they look at the 
preferences instead of expectations. The 
authors were unable to find a systematic 
relationship between a preference for 
Eurobonds and a willingness to support 
tax and budgetary coordination within 
Europe. Although managers of larger 
entities are significantly more likely to 
oppose Eurobonds, views do not depend 
on firm type (e.g. financial institution, 
financial sector service providers, or 
monetary policy makers)
Taken together, the findings suggest 
a rather gloomy perception by the 
German financial sector: Eurobonds 
are expected to come, but without the 
necessary policy prerequisites; and the 
minority who want them to come do not 
necessarily support fiscal coordination 
measures.
	 The full article appeared on: www.greekeconomistsforreform.com
     This blog publishes articles by leading academic economists on issues 
relevant to economic policy and reforms in Greece. The articles aim to offer 
constructive proposals and impartial analysis of potential, proposed or 
implemented reforms that are based on the principles of modern economics 
and on lessons from recent cutting-edge research.
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Traditional monetary models of the 
business cycle emphasize monetary 
policy transmission channels that 
operate through the demand side of the 
economy. In contrast, so-called supply-
side or cost-side channels have typically 
been ignored. More recently, empirical 
evidence in support of such supply-
side effects of monetary policy has led 
economists to introduce a cost channel 
into structural business cycle models to 
study implications for optimal monetary 
policy and for equilibrium determinacy. 
A common finding is that inflation 
targeting may become susceptible to a 
multiplicity of equilibria. Intuitively, in 
the presence of a cost channel, changes 
in the nominal interest rate have a direct 
effect on firms’ variable production costs, 
thereby weakening the effectiveness of 
the countervailing demand channel of 
monetary transmission.
In modern macroeconomics it is widely 
recognized that a reasonable monetary 
policy strategy should in any case prevent 
such equilibrium indeterminacy. 
This paper evaluates the desirability 
of an alternative monetary policy 
regime, price-level targeting, in a New 
Keynesian model with a cost channel. 
Specifically, Schmidt assumes that 
monetary policy is delegated to a central 
banker who acts under discretion and 
follows either a price-level target or 
an inflation target. The main results 
are twofold. First, determinacy regions 
under price-level targeting remain 
nearly unaffected by the introduction of 
the cost channel, whereas determinacy 
regions shrink under inflation targeting. 
Second, price-level targeting continues 
to be successful in stabilizing inflation 
and the output gap – the two target 
variables that enter a welfare-based loss 
function – whereas the stabilization 
trade-off deteriorates under inflation 
targeting. 
Due to the weak demand channel, the 
ability of the central banker to manage 
private sector expectations takes center 
stage. Under price-level targeting, 
monetary policy becomes history 
dependent. Specifically, any above-trend 
inflation episode has to be followed by 
enough below-trend inflation in order 
to bring the price level back to its target 
path. Under rational expectations lower 
expected future inflation dampens 
current inflation, which reduces the 
trade-off for the central banker in the 
contemporaneous period.
This ability of a policy strategy to use 
the expectations channel effectively 
turns out to be especially important 
once the supply-side effects of monetary 
policy are explicitly taken into account.
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The business sentiment in Germany’s 
financial sector continues to be positive, 
notwithstanding that the CFS Financial 
Center Index stayed flat in the second 
quarter, gaining a mere 0.1% compared 
to last quarter’s value. 
The various groups participating in the 
survey (i.e. financial institutions and 
brokerage firms, financial sector service 
providers, supervisory and academic 
institutions, and other connected 
enterprises) showed different trends in 
their outlook for transaction volume, 
profits, employment, and investments, 
which together comprise the four index 
components.
The business sentiment among financial 
sector service providers continues to 
be very good. Despite falling short 
of expectations, they report a further 
rise by 2.9 points. Investments and 
employment, in particular, have 
increased considerably and the outlook 
for the next quarter continues to be 
bright.
The financial institutions are slightly less 
optimistic. Following a substantial rise in 
the last quarter, the figures have declined 
somewhat, with revenue falling, yet 
investments showing a minor increase. 
With 111.6 points the expectations for 
the second quarter are just below the 
performance of the first quarter.
The two other groups – the supervisory 
and academic institutions and the other 
connected enterprises – have surpassed 
their expectations, particularly as 
investments have risen appreciably.
The Cost Channel, Indeterminacy, and Price-Level 
versus Inflation Stabilization 
By Sebastian Schmidt (CFS)
		 Schmidt, Sebastian 
“The Cost Channel, 
Indeterminacy, and 
Price-Level versus 
Inflation Stabilization”, The B.E. 
Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 11 
(2011), issue 1 (Topics), Art. 3. 
CFS Financial Center Index Remains on High Level11
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The general sentiment about the 
importance of Germany as an 
international financial center has, 
however, weakened significantly. “To a 
great deal this could be related to both 
the discussion about the upcoming stock 
exchange merger and the uncertainty 
concerning the structure of the German 
banking sector,” explains CFS Director 
Jan Pieter Krahnen.
EU Resolutions Not 
Sufficient 
According to a special survey, a majority 
of the participants (80%) continues to 
believe that the euro crisis will last 
beyond 2011 and has yet to be resolved. 
However, in comparison to a similar 
survey conducted in the past, there 
has been a substantial change of view 
regarding the further course of the crisis: 
whereas in January an almost equally 
high percentage of panelists envisaged 
that the crisis would continue at the 
current level or deepen further (40% 
and 39% respectively), a majority (now 
54%) believes the crisis will continue at 
its current level rather than deepening 
(23%). Nevertheless the financial 
sector remains cautious, “One of the 
reasons why […] could be the lack of 
credible sanction measures”, explains 
Krahnen. The penalty mechanism is 
generally not viewed to be sufficiently 
automatic (70%) nor is it considered to 
be politically enforceable (65%).
Haircut Could Affect Both Banks 
and the Taxpayer
When confronted with the question, 
who would and who should pay in the 
event that an EU member state forces 
bondholders to take a haircut on its 
bonds, the answers show considerable 
differences between personal preferences 
and expectations (see Figure 2). About 
two thirds of the panel believe that 
banks should cover the costs. This also 
applies – albeit to a lesser extent (55%) 
– to pension funds, private investors 
and insurance companies. Only one 
out of five respondents would prefer 
the taxpayer to step in. However, if a 
haircut were indeed to be enforced, the 
majority of the panelists expects the 
taxpayer would have to cover the costs 
(60%), while only a narrow majority 
foresees that banks will be making write-
offs. According to the panel, pension 
funds, insurance companies and private 
investors are least likely to have to cover 
the costs (35-40%).
      
FIGURE 2                                                               losses from haircut
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Yes No
expected for: preferred for:
Banks
Pension Funds
Private Investors
Insurances
Tax payer
Banks
Pension Funds
Private Investors
Insurances
Tax payer
		 More information can also be found 
on www.financialcenterindex.com12
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CFS Visitors Program Kick-Off
Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance 
16 – 19 May 2011 
Ph.D.-level mini-course held by David   Yermack
Professor David Yermack of the Stern School of Business, New York University offered the first graduate mini-
course as part of the newly launched CFS Visitors Program. Faculty, graduate students and researchers at Goethe 
University were invited to attend the course at no cost. The 3-session course evolved around topics on executive 
compensation and corporate governance.
The first session began with a lecture 
entitled “Executive Compensation 
Overview – Are CEOs Overpaid?” The 
findings in literature confirm that, in a 
competitive “matching” equilibrium, the 
most talented top managers work for the 
largest firms, where they have the highest 
economic impact. If differences in firm size are large at the 
very top of the distribution, then differences in CEO pay will 
also be large. This opening led to the next topic, “Risk-Taking 
Incentives”, where Yermack introduced a remedy to the 
agency costs of debt, namely “inside debt”. His conclusions 
are that CEO compensation exhibits a balance between debt 
and equity incentives with the balance systematically shifting 
away from equity and towards debt as CEOs grow older; 
and that CEOs with high debt incentives manage their firms 
more conservatively. The first session ended with a discussion 
about compensation and share price manipulation. A recent 
working paper by K. Ahern and D. Sosyura, for example, 
analyzes active media management to influence the outcome 
of important events (such as mergers) by using comprehensive 
data on media coverage and novel data on merger negotiations.
In the second session on “Corporate Directors” and “Diversity 
in the Boardroom”, David Yermack elaborated on recent 
findings in a number of subjects: retention and reputation 
incentives for outside directors; financial fraud and shareholder 
wealth; female directors’ impact on board inputs and firm 
outcomes; the influence of board diversity. 
The last session focused on “Corporate Voting” and “Founding 
Families”. Subjects such as voting rights evaluation, vote 
trading, as well as proxy voting evoke quite a lot attention in 
the corporate governance area. Talking about a first study by 
Zingales on the value of the voting right, Yermack explained 
that “traditional finance theory disregards the value of voting 
rights in pricing the common stock”. Research however has 
shown that the price of a vote is determined by the expected 
additional payment vote holders will receive for their votes in 
case of a control contest. Yermack continued with a discussion 
of issues concerning founding-family ownership and firm 
performance. He showed that empirical evidence is diverse: in 
a paper using the S&P 500, the authors argue that family firms 
perform better and that the performance of founding family 
members as CEOs is better than that of non-family CEOs. On 
the contrary, using proxy data on Fortune-500 firms, a study 
concluded that family ownership creates value only when the 
founder serves as CEO or as Chairman, while descendants 
who serve as CEOs rather destroy firm value.      Lulu Wang (CFS)
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Our sincere thanks to the Stiftung Polytechnische Gesellschaft in Frankfurt for 
their support of this program.13
CFS Colloquium | Events
Looking more closely into the roots of the financial crisis, 
Schäuble suggested that the combination of an expansionary 
monetary policy and lax credit standards must be seen as a 
social policy adopted by the U.S. government to promote the 
access of lower qualified and less privileged individuals to the 
housing market, thus enhancing their feeling of prosperity. In 
Schäuble’s view, this effort had its merits, but it cannot replace a 
sustainable education and social policy. In this sense, and despite 
its weaknesses, the German social market economy model and 
its education system can be considered superior to the American 
model, since the long term perspectives of young individuals 
without an academic degree are more realistic.
Turning to the question as to why the crisis was not confined 
to the U.S., Schäuble noted that arguments pointing only 
to the globalization and deregulation of financial markets 
are too narrow. He suggested that the intellectual roots of 
this development must be seen in the economic theories 
promoted over the last two decades by the Chicago School, 
according to which unregulated financial markets should serve 
as a worldwide reference. Despite the unquestioned merits of 
globalization, and implicitly of deregulation and interconnected 
financial markets, Schäuble pointed to the need to redefine the 
relationship between the state and financial markets. 
In his view a central lesson to be learned from the crisis was 
that highly volatile growth, driven by financial markets did 
more harm than good. Politics should lay the grounds for 
sustainable economic growth. Moreover, the right balance 
between regulation and individual freedom is essential for a well 
functioning social market economy. Schäuble suggested that 
this balance can best be obtained by a policy that might not solve 
all problems, but that nevertheless sets the framework such that 
solutions can be derived. The negative externalities of financial 
On the Relationship between State and Financial Markets – 
Lessons from the Financial Crisis  
Über das Verhältnis von Staat und Finanzmarkt – 
Lehren aus der Finanzmarktkrise 
24 February 2011 
Dr.  Wolfgang Schäuble (German Minister of Finance)
CFS Colloquium
In his opening remarks, Wolfgang Schäuble reflected on the lessons to be learned from the crisis by identifying 
its causes. Against the background of excess global liquidity and financial innovation, cheap financing induced 
by a lenient monetary policy and lax credit standards fuelled an aggressive increase in leverage, leading to an 
asset price bubble and further leverage growth.
Jan Krahnen, Wolfgang Schäuble 14
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markets can be avoided by reinforcing the links between risk, 
accountability, compensation, and responsibility. Proponents of 
the rational market theory might want to maintain a status quo, 
relying on self-regulating market forces. According to Schäuble, 
however, this theory is an oversimplification when taken 
literally. Schäuble pointed to the negative experiences of the 
last crisis, when herd behavior by financial market participants 
amplified market volatility. In this sense, politics should be 
responsible for reducing the tendency of markets to overshoot 
during crises, thus rendering the financial system more robust 
and resilient. Furthermore, this responsibility ought to be 
extended to central banks, whose policy targets should include 
financial market stability in addition to price stability. 
Schäuble emphasized that the regulation reform should be 
coordinated at EU level and should aim to address the direct 
causes of the crisis, particularly the opacity of financial market 
transactions, the distorted incentives generated by inadequate 
compensation systems, as well as the weak connection between 
risk and accountability. 
He continued by outlining the reform efforts made so far. 
First, the G20 has agreed to design an incentive system for 
manager compensation in line with the long term performance 
of a company. Second, at an institutional level, the European 
System of Financial Supervision, operational since January 
2011, has been mandated to intervene in cross-border crisis 
situations. Within Germany, the financial supervision agency 
(BaFin) has since August 2009 been given greater control 
and more intervention rights. Finally, the Basel III reform has 
made considerable progress with the new capital and liquidity 
requirements for financial institutions.
Other open issues within the regulatory reform are the shadow 
banking system and the so-called SIFIs, systemically important 
financial institutions. With regard to the former, regulatory 
arbitrage has to be contained, since banks engaging in aggressive 
maturity mismatch via their sponsored off-balance sheet vehicles 
have accumulated high leverage and encountered massive 
liquidity problems when short-term financing dried out. In the 
case of systemically important institutions, Schäuble stressed 
the need to mitigate the moral hazard problems of “too big to 
fail” and “too interconnected to fail” by introducing additional 
capital and liquidity requirements for the SIFIs. Moreover, 
the supervisory authority should be entitled to ask for a clear 
emergency plan on the part of these institutions, possibly 
involving orderly restructuring. To this extent Germany made a 
big leap forward by passing the new restructuring law for banks 
at the beginning of this year, he said. According to the new law, 
the costs of a future crisis will be borne by the financial sector 
via the restructuring fund, and financed by bank charges. With 
respect to the costs of the past crisis, Schäuble made it clear that 
he will call for the introduction of a financial transaction tax, at 
both the national and international level.
Schäuble ended by pointing to the necessity of setting limits to 
economic behavior whenever our social values are endangered.
Oana Georgescu (CFS)
Financial Stability against the Backdrop 
of the Sovereign Debt Crisis  
Finanzstabilität im Zeichen der Staatsschuldenkrise
19 January 2011 
Andreas Dombret (Board Member, Deutsche Bundesbank)
CFS Lectures
The presentation began with a brief introduction by Dombret on the importance of financial stability for 
economic well-being. He defined financial stability to be a highly effective state of the financial system, where 
all economic key functions – in particular the distribution of capital and risk – can be met in the long term. 
He considered that financial stability has two different dimensions: first, on the short term side, there is crisis 
management, which deals retroactively with acute problems and second, in the long term, stability is to be 
maintained by promoting a regulatory framework that can proactively deal with problems such as the build-up 
of imbalances and endogenous systemic risks.15
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In the case of the stability of the German financial system, 
specific challenges are involved that have been outlined in the 
November 2010 issue of the Financial Stability Review of the 
Bundesbank. The refinancing structure and the liquidity risk 
both represent important aspects for the German banking 
system. On the refinancing side, the tendency has been 
towards an increasing share of non-bank deposits, which is 
fundamentally positive. Nevertheless, the share of domestic 
bank debt securities with a short maturity remains persistently 
high. Another key factor for large banks is the development of 
market risk in their trading portfolios; this has been reduced 
since 2009. Dombret also spoke about risk diversification 
within the system and the systemic risk potential following the 
outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in several EU countries. 
He mentioned that the Review also contains a stress test on the 
performance of interest rate and commission based business of 
German banks. The scenario that was used, however, was very 
pessimistic (including a decline of 4% in GDP) and projected a 
substantially lower interest income and surging write-offs.
Dombret went on to elaborate on the current European 
sovereign debt crisis and the risk it poses for financial stability. 
The best way to create sustainable financial stability is to install 
sound public finances in all countries. The debt problems that 
several European countries currently face were essentially 
triggered by a series of homegrown mistakes. According to 
Dombret the fundamental causes for such failures can be found 
in the inadequate consolidation of state budgets in good times, 
a divergence in price competitiveness in the euro area, an 
overheating of real estate markets as well as high debt levels 
in the private sector. The systemic dimension of the sovereign 
debt crisis became instantly obvious when confidence in Greek 
public finances dwindled in spring 2010. Both the short-term 
and long-term aspects of financial stability should be considered 
here in order to achieve lasting and sustainable protection 
against debt crises, said Dombret. In the short-term, the 
objective must be to interrupt the dynamics of the crisis in order 
to gain time for implementing measures aimed at consolidating 
public finances and implementing structural reforms. However, 
it is the long-term measures that are of particular importance, 
with the main focus on prevention. In this respect it is crucial 
to ensure that incentives are such that they instill a sense of 
own financial responsibility on the part of both industry and 
the state.
Preventive measures, not only the adherence to strict fiscal 
rules and the alignment of economic policies but also the 
establishment of a permanent crisis-management mechanism, 
should always observe strict rules: temporary assistance to 
individual EU member states should only be possible in those 
exceptional cases in which the stability of the monetary union 
is at risk. However, measures that hollow out the responsibility 
of states by taking a joint-liability approach ignore the lessons 
to be learnt from the crisis. In this light, the introduction of 
Eurobonds, for example, has to be viewed critically.
Dombret also spoke about the direction regulation and policy 
should take in order to reach a sustainable financial system. 
From an institutional point of view, the founding of the 
European Systemic Risk Board represents an important step 
for macro prudential monitoring. Moreover the tools required 
for handling systemic risks are currently in the making. The 
new bank regulation (Basel III) includes the use of Contingent 
Capital or Bail-in instruments in the capital structure, as well as 
a capital surcharge for systemically important institutions, and 
the development of counter-cyclical capital buffers. Problems 
may arise here, however, owing to regulatory arbitrage which 
particularly endangers the effectiveness of macro prudential 
measures.
Finally, Dombret mentioned several future tasks in the field 
of financial stability, which will demand accountability and a 
need for more communication with markets and the public. 
In addition, he said that academic research must engage more 
comprehensively in the pressing issues of financial stability. 
Generally, Dombret expressed the need for a more pronounced 
and transparent exchange of information. In particular, public 
trust in the social market economy must be strengthened 
through proactive reporting on the risks and profits from 
financial activities.
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After the opening words by Issing, Borges started the 
discussion by presenting the IMF’s newly issued economic 
outlook for Europe that explains the IMF’s analysis of the 
current situation in Europe and its ongoing policy issues. 
According to Borges, the IMF is quite optimistic about the 
fact that, apart from the euro area’s debt crisis, there is fairly 
solid and well-spread economic growth, especially in Eastern 
Europe. He pointed out that Europe has potentially much to 
gain from further economic integration, which is therefore 
very desirable and represents a win-win situation for all. As 
regards monetary policy Borges stated that, “[The IMF is] 
supportive of the ECB’s monetary policy stance of returning 
to normalization step by step”. For the time being, Borges 
did not envisage a significant rise in inflationary expectations. 
During most of his discussion Borges focused on the euro 
area’s debt crisis. According to him, the European Monetary 
Union is not complete but rather a work in progress. “What 
we benefited from during the last ten years was a dramatically 
increasing capital flow across Europe. […] Unfortunately in a 
few countries this capital essentially took the form of credit 
that was poorly used.” He emphasized that the euro crisis not 
only concerns public finances but also the private domain 
where the non-tradable sector almost exclusively benefited 
from the spending boom made possible through easily available 
credit. Resources were allocated in ways that were beneficial 
to a few (protected) sectors but detrimental to the rest of 
the economy. “Governments then had an incentive to keep on 
borrowing to maintain the growth in the non-tradable sector. 
[…] This is in no way sustainable and had to come to an end 
as is happening right now”, he said. Borges also mentioned 
that Europe’s imbalanced and incomplete monetary union 
still features strong restrictions on equity flows and resists 
turning to foreign investors for resolving the weaknesses. He 
explained that, in a complete monetary union, changes in asset 
prices can be arbitraged rather quickly, which could mitigate 
problems, in particular those concerning debt issues. “The key 
message for us”, Borges concluded, “is that we have to look at 
the competitive issues in a broader sense, in terms of resource 
allocation […] and we have to have a far going economic and 
financial integration to make sure this does not happen again”. 
Next, Papademos gave his assessment of the IMF report empha-
sizing three aspects: (i) economic outlook and associated risks, 
(ii) the sovereign debt crisis, and (iii) fiscal restructuring policy.
He stressed that at the global level the recovery is gaining 
momentum: the stock markets and many commodity markets 
are booming. At the same time, there are risks which are 
masked by such reassuring developments. The first problem 
is unemployment, which remains stubbornly high in some 
countries. According to Papademos, a closer look at the factors 
Antonio Borges, Otmar Issing, Lucas Papademos 
Panel Discussion
Strengthening the Recovery: The IMF’s Outlook for Europe
12 May 2011 
On May, 12th Otmar Issing (President of the Center for Financial Studies) was joined by Antonio Borges 
(Director, European Department, IMF) and Lucas Papademos (Harvard University, CFS Senior Fellow) in the 
House of Finance for a panel discussion about the regional economic outlook for Europe.
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that are driving the problem could offer good guidance to 
countries that are facing serious labor market problems. 
The second risk he identified is the existence of various 
contagious channels and feedback mechanisms between 
public finances, the banking industry and the real economy. 
A third potential risk comes from inflation developments. 
Papademos continued with future policy issues, where he sees a 
need to address the interconnectivity between fiscal, monetary 
and regulatory policies. He also emphasized the importance 
of eliminating the risk of moral hazard and stressed the 
importance of implementing the Basel III framework on capital 
liquidity requirements in an effective and timely manner.
He then addressed a possible debt restructuring for Greece 
and other euro area countries, saying that it is both undesirable 
and unnecessary because it entails real costs and potential risks 
that outweigh any potential benefits. He explained that the 
resulting losses from a debt restructuring would ultimately be 
borne to a very large extent by governments and tax payers. 
Debt restructuring would furthermore have a particularly 
profound impact on the banking sector and a systemic spillover 
effect on the real economy. “Most importantly”, he said, “it 
may undermine the strong focus and effort required to address 
the root causes of the fiscal imbalances and competitive 
weaknesses”. He concluded with a positive note on resolving 
the sovereign debt crisis. Although it is likely to be difficult, 
said Papademos, it is of common interest to all euro area 
countries to preserve the stability and credibility of the euro. 
The discussion was summarized by Issing who thanked 
both panelists and congratulated the IMF on this impressive 
report. The importance of financial integration was reiterated 
by all speakers. Subsequent questions from the audience 
mainly addressed the incompleteness of financial integration, 
monetary policy, and growth. The panel was closed by 
Issing with the statement that “It will be interesting to 
see the results of the reforms that are underway. […It] 
still needs optimism, but [a success] is not impossible”.
                         Lulu Wang (CFS)
Get Real: Interpreting Nominal Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
15 June 2011 
Richard Clarida (C. Lowell Harriss Professor of Economics, Columbia University and Global Strategic Advisor, PIMCO)
CFS hosted a lecture by Professor Richard Clarida from Columbia University. He spoke about the discrepancies 
in fluctuations of the observed nominal and fair-value exchange rates with reference to institutional innovation 
of inflation-indexed bonds. Clarida has extensive academic and practical experience as well as a number of 
seminal publications. Since 2006 he also serves as a Global Strategic Advisor for PIMCO.
Clarida presented the results of one of his latest works. 
Within his model, a connection between the nominal 
exchange rate, national price level and observed yields of 
long-term inflation-indexed bonds is derived. He revealed 
the assumptions imposed which are more intuitive rather 
then restrictive. According to him, a necessary condition 
to use this approach is the assumption that the real price 
of the asset today depends on the real value of cash flow it 
delivers at maturity and not on the price level of the asset in 
a future period. Clarida emphasized that the model does not 
require restrictive assumptions, such as complete markets, 
representative agent or other special structures to be imposed.
The essence of the model that he presented was an 
innovative, observable measure of risk premium that can 
open up a wedge between the level of the spot exchange 
rate and its risk neutral value. This key finding was later 
on compared to other similar models in existing literature. 
Clarida also talked about the results of the empirical 
testing of the model using a high frequency dataset 
spanning a ten year period. He showed real time 
decompositions of pound, euro, and yen exchange rates 
into their risk neutral and risk premium components. 
He concluded that the outlined approach could be potentially 
useful for central banks in interpreting the exchange rate 
fluctuations between monetary reports. In his opinion 
the model is potentially superior to other approaches, 
given that it does not require to take into account what 
fraction of the change in the nominal rate was forecastable. 
The discussion that followed was moderated by CFS 
Director Michael Haliassos. Clarida answered questions 
about the assumptions of the model and its implementation.
                       Daniela Dimitrova (CFS)18
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Weidmann said that central banks had made a major contribution 
in managing the recent financial crisis. However, it has also 
revealed the limitations of what central banks, and more 
specifically monetary policy, can and should deliver. Since the 
financial crisis, governments and central banks have played a 
more pro-active role in correcting undesirable macroeconomic 
and asset price developments. This is a major shift of attitude 
from the one that was prevailing before the crisis. Weidmann 
asked how monetary policy could contribute to preventing the 
emergence of financial imbalances. Given that price stability 
remains a central bank’s first priority, using one instrument to 
meet different objectives will lead to a loss of credibility on the 
central bank’s primary goal. 
However, this does not prejudice the fact that monetary policy 
should put greater emphasis on monetary and credit aggregates 
in order to avoid a build-up of financial imbalances. Regarding 
the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, Weidmann stressed that 
the Eurosystem has adopted from the start a two pillar approach 
with a monetary pillar that takes the analysis of money supply 
and credit development into consideration. This pillar, said 
Weidmann, should certainly be reinforced, for example with 
early warning indicators for adverse developments in the 
financial markets with an impact on price stability. 
Weidmann made a clear division between monetary and macro-
prudential policy tasks. It is imperative that macro-prudential 
policy has an own, independent set of instruments to fulfill its 
tasks, so that monetary policy can pursue its primary goal of 
price stability, he said. Central banks are in many crucial points 
involved in the reform process for micro- and macro-prudential 
supervision. However, for any participation in such supervisory 
tasks, central banks need to warranty their independence.
He stressed that the unconventional measures that have been 
adopted by central banks in the recent past can create false 
incentives. They might, for example, prevent the banking 
sector from taking the necessary decisions for restructuring. 
Weidmann called for a timely scaling-back of the special crisis 
measures, in parallel with the recovery of the markets.
Today’s Challenges for Central Banks – 
Considerations in Light of the Financial and Economic Crisis  
Aktuelle Herausforderungen für Zentralbanken – 
Betrachtungen im Lichte der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise 
20 June 2011 
Jens  Weidmann (President Deutsche Bundesbank)
CFS was very honored to welcome the new President of the Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, for a first public lecture 
in Frankfurt. He spoke about the lessons that can be drawn from the recent past and the role of central banks in 
times of crisis. He expressed clear views on the mandate of central banks and also spoke about the role of research 
for improving the analytical instruments for monetary decision-making and financial supervision.
Uwe Walz, Jens Weidmann 19
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The Euro Needs more Clarity  
Der Euro braucht mehr Klarheit 
8 February 2011 
Hans Tietmeyer (Former President of the Deutsche Bundesbank)
CFS Presidential Lectures
Hans Tietmeyer was the first speaker in the Presidential Lecture series on European Integration in 2011. He 
spoke about the euro crisis and the fundamental economic and political questions that need to be addressed in 
determining Europe’s future direction. Questions about whether the Eurosystem’s common monetary policy, com-
plemented by fiscal policy surveillance at the supranational level, is sufficient to guarantee the stability of the euro 
or whether we need to move in the direction of a transfer union or even towards a far reaching Political Union 
were already the order of the day before the Maastricht Treaty and are still under discussion today. Tietmeyer 
began his presentation with a historical outline on the euro.
A Short Retrospect
Tietmeyer explained that, at the 
very early stages of the European 
unification process in the 1950s, 
given that the Bretton Woods 
System was functioning well, the 
issue of a European currency was 
basically factored out. By the end 
of the 60s, however, currency problems were on the rise in 
the European Economic Community and it was decided at a 
summit in The Hague that integration in Europe should move 
in the direction of an economic and monetary union (EMU). 
The Werner Group1 produced a report in 1970 that envisaged 
a common currency with an independent central bank and 
an economic decision-making body at a supranational level. 
The concept laid down in the report, however, found little 
approval among the six members and the attempt to narrow 
and coordinate the fluctuations against the dollar after the 
collapse of Bretton Woods (by creating the “snake in the 
tunnel” mechanism) quickly failed owing to differing national 
policy approaches to global problems (such as, for example, 
the oil price explosion). Renewed efforts in the late 70s to 
introduce the European Currency Unit (ECU) also enjoyed 
only limited success. It was during the course of the 80s that 
progress began to be made towards reducing exchange rate 
instability, eventually leading to a new initiative inspired by 
Jacques Delors2. The so-called Delors Report mapped out 
a route aimed at achieving monetary union. According to 
Tietmeyer, it comprised three central points: 1) participation 
on a voluntary basis only under predefined criteria, 2) the 
creation of an independent supranational system of central 
banks, and 3) no new supranational institution for economic 
decision-making and/or supervision. The negotiations of this 
proposal by the meanwhile 12 EU member states coincided 
Hans Tietmeyer
In his speech, Weidmann also emphasized the role of research. 
Central banks need advanced analytical tools to take well-
founded decisions. New approaches, such as implementing 
the so-called risk-taking channel or financial market frictions 
in macroeconomic models, are still at an early stage and leave 
much room for additional academic research. He also stressed 
the importance of strong research departments at central 
banks.
Finally, he also pointed to the problem of blurred responsi-
bilities between monetary and fiscal policy. Preventing a 
member state’s bankruptcy or insolvency or supporting 
insolvent financial institutions are not part of the EU’s 
common monetary policy. Such decisions are to be taken by 
governments and parliaments. 
For the sake of independence and credibility, it is important to 
turn the attention back to the key mandate of central banks, 
he concluded.
1 Chaired by Pierre Werner, Prime Minister of Luxembourg.
2   Produced by the Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, chaired by the then President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, and 
including all EC central bank governors20
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with another important process in Europe, namely that of 
accepting the reunification of Germany. The negotiations 
culminated in 1992 in the signing of the Maastricht Treaty with 
its fixed convergence criteria (also known as the Maastricht 
criteria) for the participating countries and a clear mandate for 
an independent European Central Bank. The Treaty further 
stipulated the monitoring of economic developments in order 
to reach a sustained convergence of economic performance 
across member states, and it also entailed a “no-bail-out 
clause”, specifying that neither the community nor any 
member state shall be liable for or assume the commitments 
of any other member state.
In the years to follow, the EU’s internal convergence process 
made significant progress and led in 1999 to the final 
step towards a monetary unification by 11 member states. 
According to Tietmeyer, the convergence criteria were 
interpreted quite loosely from the start and continued to 
be so. The newly introduced euro soon developed a strong 
reputation, mainly thanks to the ECB’s successful monetary 
policy. Many peripheral countries in the euro area, however, 
used the improved currency conditions for an artificial 
upgrade of their living standards without ensuring any 
sustainable improvement in their competitiveness. Tietmeyer 
criticized that the growing divergences within the euro area 
had been faced neither by politicians nor by financial markets.
Growing Divergence
As addressing such divergences was de facto taboo, Tietmeyer 
said, financial markets had misjudged the effects of a common 
currency: the abolishment of the exchange rate risk was 
placed, to a large extent, on an equal footing with dissolving 
the country risk and thus led to an almost complete interest 
rate convergence within the euro area. Tietmeyer, however, 
emphasized that interest rate convergence within a currency 
union should only apply to the short-term money market 
rates, but not to the longer term capital market rates that 
reflect a specific risk situation.
According to Tietmeyer, it was precisely in this respect that 
mistakes were made during the first 10 years of the euro 
because: (i) financial markets saw the euro area as one risk 
community and the no-bail-out rules from the Maastricht 
Treaty were not taken seriously, and (ii) there was a lack of 
control on the part of uncritical authorities with respect to this 
growing divergence that caused the general public to be misled.
It was only after the Greek budget problems became obvious 
in 2009 that the financial markets finally had to face up to 
the sovereign debt risks in Europe. During the subsequent 
political discussions about necessary measures, the reaction of 
the financial markets became problematic. Furthermore, the 
ECB took a controversial role in buying government bonds, 
a decision that was at the limit of legal admissibility and a 
problem for the credibility of the institution’s independence, 
said Tietmeyer.
The Euro Area’s Future
It also became obvious that there were many different opinions 
on how to improve the Maastricht rules, with a majority of the 
German politicians being in favor of more budgetary discipline 
and stronger rules, while the politicians of other member 
states tended to be more in favor of a transfer union. 
The support measures currently in place and the creation of 
the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
have now set the path for the long term agenda; however, the 
new procedures for fiscal control and for a better economic 
coordination are still to be finalized. Many countries remain 
skeptical towards semi-automatic rules and attach great 
importance to the political decision process. By contrast, 
Tietmeyer stressed that such political majority decisions often 
prohibit clear rules and hinder a sustainable solution and 
should, therefore, be kept to a minimum when concerning 
issues that are pivotal to the (stability of the) currency.
According to Tietmeyer, it is doubtful that, in the foreseeable 
future, a political union in a Europe of 27 members can be 
achieved. This standstill, however, should by no means be the 
start of an erosion process, the common currency must be 
viewed as a one way road for the participating countries, said 
Tietmeyer. To this end an improvement of the current set of 
rules is urgently required. 
Tietmeyer said that the critical course of events will not be 
halted by the current incantations about cooperation and 
solidarity. He sees three areas where change is needed: (i) 
the monitoring of the fiscal and debt policy of member states 
needs to be tightened and non-compliance with the fiscal 
rules should have consequences in semi-automatic way; (ii) 
not only the common ground but also the differences within 
the euro area should be clear for financial markets to judge; 
(iii) rules and surveillance should be better coordinated and 
harmonized.
Tietmeyer concluded his speech by stating that Europe is facing 
a serious challenge. With new rules and clear boundaries 
regarding its possibilities and limitations, the euro, however, 
should overcome its problems.21
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Ackermann identified three areas of major concern for European 
banks. First, the weight of the global economy is shifting away 
from Europe and other developed countries towards emerging 
economies. Some banks within Europe have reacted to this by 
increasing their market share and/or expanding to other regions 
in the world. Still, competition is becoming increasingly intense 
and banks from emerging markets are on the rise. Second, the 
developed countries have a much higher level of sovereign debt 
than the emerging countries. This has an impact on the banks 
through their direct exposures, higher refinancing costs and 
higher taxes. In addition, private household debt in the EU 
countries is too high and therefore limits the growth potential 
of credit business. Third, regulation has been undergoing a 
paradigm shift since the financial crisis. Although banks have 
supported a reworking of the regulatory framework, there 
is a general misconception concerning the impact of such a 
comprehensive overhaul. The new regulatory requirements 
for capital and liquidity under Basel III together with a lack of 
strong growth prospects in Europe help to explain why many 
European banks have recently shown a rather weak performance 
in business growth. Owing to their poor revenue and earning 
power in comparison to many banks in other regions, they seem 
more likely to suffer a negative impact from the new rules. 
Furthermore, other regulatory projects (such as a review of the 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive) will also have negative 
repercussions on the refinancing costs of European banks.
Ackermann went on to discuss the various courses of action 
available for dealing with these issues. In the first instance, 
banks have to do their homework on strategic planning. A solid 
capital base with a well-managed internal capital allocation, a 
strong presence in new growth markets, and a policy of strict 
cost discipline are among the key factors. 
Preventing undesirable developments 
in the regulatory framework is a 
second line of action. Ackermann 
stressed how harmful it can be if one 
country takes regulatory initiatives 
unilaterally. He used the bank levy 
and financial transaction tax as 
examples where a go-it-alone course 
of action by one country can be 
very detrimental for its banking sector. For this reason, 
according to Ackermann, Europe should take a strong stance 
on harmonizing regulation and its implementation in order to 
avoid competitive disadvantages for European banks. Useful 
European initiatives – such as the Single Euro Payments Area 
European Banks – A Glance into the Future   
Europas Banken – Ein Blick in die Zukunft 
1 June 2011 
Josef Ackermann (Vorsitzender des   Vorstands und des Group Executive Committee, Deutsche Bank AG)
In his speech for the Presidential Lectures series, Josef Ackermann spoke about the enormous challenges that lie 
ahead for the European banking sector and the need for action, not only by banks but also by policy makers and 
political authorities.
Otmar Issing, Josef Ackermann or SEPA – should, however, be promoted rather than impeded. 
In this context, Ackermann also spoke about the value of the 
integrated European financial market and the achievements 
of the European Union. He warned against the growing 
tendency in many European member states to focus foremost on 
national interests. Even difficult decisions, such as the ongoing 
discussions aimed at solving the euro crisis, should not be 
reduced to singular facts but should rather be considered within 
the context of the European integration process. Without the 
EU, Ackermann said, European countries will play only a 
marginal role in the global politics of the future.
A third field of action lies in triggering a new dynamic for 
growth in Europe. Ackermann sees unused potential in several 
financial market segments (for example, in asset management 
and in retail markets). He also sees substantial growth potential 
in financing the transformation process in society towards a 
clean and energy efficient (and thus less dependent) economy. 
Innovativeness and new financing solutions (possibly as public-
private partnerships) will be required.
Ackermann concluded that, despite the enormous challenges 
involved in these issues, Europe’s banking sector should keep 
hold of the reins itself and reflect on its strengths.
Kenneth Rogoff is the Award Winner of 
the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics 2011
22
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The DB Prize 2011 is awarded to the 
U.S. economist Kenneth Rogoff for 
his groundbreaking contributions to 
the field of international finance and 
macroeconomics. “Kenneth Rogoff’s 
work examines sovereign default and 
debt restructuring, exchange rate 
developments, global imbalances and 
the development of financial crises and 
is highly relevant for understanding 
and addressing today’s global 
challenges. Kenneth Rogoff has not 
only contributed pioneering work of 
the greatest academic importance, he 
has also made his findings accessible 
to a broad public,” said Jury Chairman 
and CFS Director Uwe Walz. 
Rogoff is Professor of Economics and 
Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Public 
Policy at Harvard University. He has 
published numerous academic papers 
in the field of international finance 
and macroeconomics. The book he 
recently published jointly with Carmen 
Reinhart, entitled “This Time is 
Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly” (2009), investigates the history 
of financial crises over the last eight 
centuries and was awarded the Paul 
A. Samuelson Award from the TIAA-
CREF Institute.
Prior to his time at Harvard, Rogoff 
taught at the University of California, 
Berkeley and at Princeton University. 
He has been a visiting professor at 
institutes including the London 
School of Economics and New York 
University, and has worked as a guest 
researcher for the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. From 
2001 to 2003 he was the Chief 
Economist and Director of Research 
at the International Monetary Fund. 
Kenneth Rogoff has been a member 
of the Group of Thirty (G30), an 
international committee made up of 
30 leading current and former policy-
makers, financiers, and academics.
A leading figure in 
international macroeconomics
Rogoff’s work includes among others 
research on exchange rates, the 
credibility of monetary policy and 
central bank independence, sovereign 
debt and the history of financial crises. 
As such, Rogoff is today’s leading figure 
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in international macroeconomics, a 
field which his work covers in its 
entire thematic spectrum. His findings 
have permanently influenced academic 
theories and empirical research. This 
applies not only to his latest work 
on the financial crisis, but also to his 
earlier studies. Rogoff’s work has made 
a significant difference to the education 
of young economists over the past 
30 years. The Meese-Rogoff Puzzle 
(published in 1983) which relates 
to the unpredictability of exchange 
rates using economic models has had 
a profound effect on research and 
teaching as well as economic practice. 
It is still considered to be the central 
empirical fact about major currency 
exchange rates. His 1985 paper on 
central bank independence and 
inflation targeting not only sparked 
a large academic literature on 
institutional solutions to the problem 
of monetary policy credibility, but 
was also influential in a sweeping 
international trend towards 
establishing strong independent 
central banks which had previously 
been relatively rare. Together with 
Maurice Obstfeld, Kenneth Rogoff is 
one of the founders of the “New Open 
Economy Macroeconomics”, which 
offers a theoretical basis for analyzing 
open economies and forming policies. 
It has proven especially useful for 
central banks.
Award Ceremony 
and CFS Symposium
The award will be presented to Rogoff 
by Josef Ackermann, CEO of Deutsche 
Bank. The award ceremony will take 
place as part of a scientific symposium 
in honor of Professor Rogoff under 
the topic “Global perspective on the 
financial crisis” at Campus Westend. 
We are honored to announce that 
Governor Stanley Fischer (Bank of 
Israel) has confirmed his participation 
as keynote speaker and we are 
delighted to announce as plenary 
speakers:  Jeremy Bulow (Professor 
of Economics at the Graduate 
School of Business, Stanford), Marc 
Flandreau (Professor of International 
Economics and International History at 
the Graduate Institute of International 
and Development Studies, Geneva) and 
Carmen Reinhart.
 Sabine Kimmel (CFS)
		 Award Ceremony and academic Symposium “Global perspective on the financial crisis” 
    Thursday 22 September 2011, 12:00 – 17:30
    Venue: Campus Westend, Goethe University, New Lecture Hall (Hörsaal 2)
    The program and registration for this event are available on 
  www.db-prize-financialeconomics.org
  - The number of participants is limited -
Josef Ackermann (Chairman of the Management Board and the Group Executive 
Committee of Deutsche Bank AG) “Professor Rogoff has made many seminal 
contributions to economics, ranging from the analysis of exchange rates 
and monetary policy to sovereign default and debt restructuring. He has 
admirably combined theoretical, empirical, and historical analysis in his 
research. His recent work on the history of banking crises (together with 
Carmen Reinhart) has become essential reading for every academic and 
practitioner in the financial sector. I am therefore very pleased that he has 
been awarded this year’s Deutsche Bank Prize for Financial Economics.”
STATEMENT24
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A Jury of international financial experts decides on the recipient of the prize. Members of the Jury for 2011 are: Luigi Guiso 
(European University Institute), Michael Haliassos (CFS Director), Charles Yuji Horioka (Osaka University), Otmar Issing 
(CFS President), Jan Pieter Krahnen (CFS Director), Raimond Maurer (Goethe University), Thomas Mayer (Deutsche Bank 
AG), Carmen M. Reinhart (Peterson Institute for International Economics) and the winner of the Deutsche Bank Prize in 
Financial Economics 2009, Robert J. Shiller (Yale University). Chairman of the Jury is CFS Director Uwe Walz. 
More than 3,800 university teachers and researchers from 60 countries had the opportunity to submit a suggestion for the nomination. At this 
occasion, the Jury would like to thank the nominators for theirs immense support during the nomination procedure.
Charles Yuji Horioka: “Professor Kenneth 
Rogoff is deeply deserving of the 2011 Deutsche 
Bank Prize for at least three reasons:  First, he 
has done truly seminal work on an impressive 
array of topics in international finance and 
international macroeconomics, ranging from 
exchange rate forecasting, political budget 
cycles, monetary policy and central bank design, 
global imbalances, sovereign debt, New Open 
Economy Macro-economics, and the history 
of financial crises. Second, he has skillfully 
combined theoretical, empirical, and historical 
approaches in his work. Third, his work has 
important practical and policy implications, 
he has been an active participant in policy 
debates, and he has helped shaped policy, 
especially during his tenure as chief economist 
of the International Monetary Fund.”
Otmar Issing: “In light of the breadth and depth of his work and 
its influence on the academic and political debate, Prof. Rogoff 
is a worthy winner of the Deutsche Bank Prize. He captivates 
his readers with the rigorous theoretical analysis and empirical 
foundation of his publications. His latest work, “This Time is 
Different” demonstrates how economists can make an intelligible 
contribution to our understanding of the world.”
Thomas Mayer: “Professor Rogoff has not only made key 
contributions to economics, but his work has also guided 
practitioners in central banks and the financial sector. His book 
on the history of financial crises, written jointly with Carmen 
Reinhart, has become essential reading for every financial market 
and bank economist.”
Carmen M. Reinhart: “I am delighted that Ken Rogoff has been 
awarded this year’s DB Prize for Financial Economics. He is a leader 
in the field of international finance and his many works span both 
theory and empirics. His insights have influenced in the past two 
decades academic and policy circles alike. His contributions encompass a 
broad range of timeless topics: exchange rate determination and policy, 
sovereign debt restructuring, debt buybacks, and default, political 
economy cycles, monetary policy making and inflation objectives, the 
role on international institutions, microeconomic foundations of modern 
open-economy models, and more recently, financial crises.”
Robert J. Shiller: “Kenneth Rogoff has 
revolutionized modern international 
finance. His penetrating research has 
changed the way we think about all the 
interlinkages of the world’s economies 
and the problems faced by policy makers 
in a global economy. Writing with a 
perspicacious and graceful manner 
that makes complex ideas seem simple, 
his path-breaking research has an 
enormous audience. Rogoff is a guiding 
force for our age.”
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The ECB and Its Watchers XII 
10 June 2012 
Frankfurt am Main
This year’s meeting marked a record 
number of more than 300 registered 
participants, among them 70 media and 
press representatives. As in the past, 
it was partly covered live by CNBC, 
Bloomberg and Reuters TV. Speeches 
at the conference were widely reported 
and commented on by the national and 
international press and by all major 
international news services. 
In his introduction, the conference 
organizer  Volker Wieland (Goethe 
University and CFS) pointed to the 
increasing divergence of policymakers’ 
and citizens’ assessment of the state of 
the euro. “There is no crisis of the euro. 
Instead, what we are currently observing 
in parts of the euro area is first and 
foremost a fiscal crisis.” This message 
had been repeated for months by the 
ECB President, ECB Board and Council 
members and other EU policymakers. 
By contrast, when asked by the ZDF 
Politbarometer on April 15, whether the 
financial difficulties of some euro area 
countries were currently endangering 
the stability of the euro, 79 percent of 
the respondents answered with Yes. 
When asked whether in addition to 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland, they 
expect that more EU countries will 
need financial support, 87 percent of 
the respondents answered with Yes.
In his 2011 address to the ECB watchers, 
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet 
presented evidence that the euro area 
and the United States of America have 
similar features in terms of diversity 
of the economies, as measured on the 
level of member countries in the euro 
area and member states of the American 
Union. Such similarities are apparent 
regarding asymmetric inflation, 
asymmetric growth developments and 
even the persistence of asymmetric 
gains and losses of competitiveness. 
Thus, President Trichet rejected the 
seemingly common belief that the euro 
area as a whole is significantly more 
heterogeneous economically than the 
US. He acknowledged, however, that 
governing such diverse economies with 
a single currency is more of a challenge 
in a union of sovereign states than in 
This conference series brings together “The ECB and its Watchers” since 1999. This year, ECB watchers certainly 
met at a crucial time for the European Monetary Union. Throughout 2010 and 2011 EU leaders had been 
working on creating new institutions of fiscal governance and financial surveillance for the euro area. Ireland 
and Portugal had turned to the EU and IMF for fiscal support, and doubts regarding the ability of the Greek 
government to achieve its program targets have reached new heights. Furthermore, government officials had 
sent conflicting messages regarding the desirability or danger of sovereign debt restructuring in the weeks 
preceding the conference.
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a political federation. For this reason, 
he advocated strongly reinforcing euro 
area economic governance and aligning 
the economic policy of each member 
with EMU requirements. He closed 
quoting Alexander Hamilton, “we 
should ourselves learn to think (more) 
continentally”. 
In the first debating session, ECB Vice-
President Vítor Constâncio exchanged 
views with Martin Hellwig (MPI 
Bonn) on the state of the European 
banking system and the effectiveness of 
the new macro-prudential architecture. 
In Vice-President Constâncio’s view, 
significant progress is being made in 
Europe to produce a more comprehensive 
and encompassing concept of economic 
governance. He called for further 
reinforcing the euro area dimension of 
economic governance, in particular by 
fully integrating financial supervision 
within the concept of economic 
governance; and by establishing a pan-
euro area resolution fund. Hellwig 
criticized the German banking system, 
and called in particular for reducing 
the over-capacity created by the 
existence and political protection of the 
Landesbanken. In general, he called for 
much larger capital requirements of 20 
percent or more. 
It was followed by a debate between 
Klaus Regling (CEO, EFSF), Jordi 
Galí (CREI-UPF) and Clemens 
Fuest  (Oxford University) on the 
institutional framework for ensuring 
fiscal stability in the euro area. While 
Klaus Regling expressed confidence 
that the combination of the new rescue 
arrangements and improved economic 
oversight currently being put in place 
will prove adequate for resolving the 
current as well as potential future 
sovereign crises, Galí and Fuest were 
more skeptical. Jordi Galí recommended 
returning to a system without collective 
bailouts and monetization of debt. Only 
the IMF should play the role of lender 
of last resort to governments. Clemens 
Fuest emphasized the need to make sure 
that the financial sector can absorb a 
sovereign bankruptcy without a financial 
meltdown. To this end, much tighter 
capital requirements, transitional rescue 
arrangements and continued access of 
banks to ECB refinancing are needed.  
The afternoon program started off 
with a more informal conversation 
with  Donald Kohn (Brookings 
Institution, former Vice-Chair of the 
Federal Reserve Board) and Min Zhu 
(International Monetary Fund, former 
Deputy Governor PBoC) moderated 
by Volker Wieland. As to the role of 
asset prices in monetary policy, Kohn 
maintained his view that leaning-
against-the wind is not the way to go. 
Then, the discussion focused on the role 
of exchange rates and reserve currencies 
in the international monetary system. 
Min Zhu explained the reasons for the 
Chinese approach with tightly managed 
exchange rates. He also expressed the 
need for a more multi-polar international 
monetary system. With regard to capital 
flows, Kohn acknowledged that the 
United States did not sufficiently take 
into account its own advice to emerging 
economies with regard to the question 
of hot capital inflows prior to this crisis. 
Finally, ECB Board Member Jürgen 
Stark discussed how monetary policy 
would need to be adjusted to maintain 
price stability and normalize liquidity 
supply. He warned of upside risks to 
price stability. The pace of monetary 
expansion is recovering while the level 
of monetary liquidity remains ample. 
He compared the current situation with 
sustained upward trends in commodity 
prices to the 1970s, pointing to the 
example of the Bundesbank tightening 
policy at that time, and achieving lower 
inflation than in other OECD economies. 
His debating partner, Julian Callow 
(Barclays Capital) thoroughly reviewed 
the different sources of price pressures 
in the current environment, and 
analyzed alternative measures for the 
appropriate policy stance in the U.S. and 
euro area. With regard to broad money 
and credit growth he differed from 
Jürgen Stark’s assessment, noting rather 
weak growth, with credit institutions 
expanding balance sheets slowly. Thus, 
he de-emphasized inflation risks from 
monetary developments. 
 Volker Wieland
Marsh, Issing, Garganas
Jean-Claude Trichet 
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Senior Fellow
Former CFS Director Axel A. Weber has accepted to become a Senior Fellow at CFS. He is currently Visiting 
Professor of Economics at Chicago Booth School of Business and is to be nominated for election to the Board 
of Directors of UBS in 2012 and to be appointed Chairman in 2013. 
From 2004 till 2011 he was the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank and a member of the Governing Council 
of the European Central Bank. In recent years he has also acted as a member of the Steering Committee of the 
European Systemic Risk Board and of the Financial Stability Board. In addition, he has served as the German Governor of the 
International Monetary Fund, as a member of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, and as member 
of the G7 and the G20 Ministers and Governors. 
Before moving to politics, he was a Professor for International Economics at the University of Cologne. Weber has a long standing 
affiliation with our research institute. From 1998 to 2002, he was Director at CFS and a Professor for Monetary Economics at 
Goethe University. After that he remained an active member of our board of trustees.
New Finance Minister of Portugal
Vitor Gaspar has been appointed as the new finance minister of Portugal. Gaspar has been a special adviser 
to the Bank of Portugal and was head of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers at the European Commission 
from 2007 to 2010, and Director General Research at the European Central Bank from 1998 till 2004. Since 
his time at the ECB he has been a member of CFS’ Research Advisory Board.
The Joint Lunchtime Seminar is celebrating its 10th anniversary this year. Initiated by Axel Weber (CFS), Frank Smets (ECB) and 
Heinz Herrmann (Deutsche Bundesbank) in 2001, it is a joint initiative of the three institutions to this day. Since its start, the 
series aims to promote the presentation of high quality papers by researchers engaged in research of interest to central banks. 
Over the years, the organizers have not only given young professionals an opportunity to present their newest research findings, 
but also invited prominent speakers from the academia, central banks, think tanks and research institutions alike. In 2011 the Joint 
Lunchtime Seminar organizers are again hosting exceptional professionals from around the globe to share their research with a 
small selected circle at the ECB. The list of speakers in the 1st half year of 2011 included:
Alexander Kriwoluzky (University of Bonn)
Filip Matejka (Center for Economic Research & Graduate Education, 
Economics Institute)
Christian Matthes (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Kristoffer Nimark (Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional)
Dimitri Vayanos (London School of Economics)
Leonardo Melosi (London Business School)
Claudia Buch (Universität Tübingen)
Alexander Ljungqvist (New York University, Stern School)
Jean-Paul L’Huillier (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance)
Viral Acharya (New York University, Stern School) 
Alan Auerbach (University of California, Berkeley)
Joel Shapiro (Oxford University)
Juan Ignacio Peña (Universidad Carlos III Madrid) 
Victoria Ivashina (Harvard Business School)
Albrecht Ritschl (London School of Economics)
Salvatore Nistico (Università di Roma “La Sapienza” and LUISS Guido Carli) 
Peter Karadi (National Bank of Hungary)
Peter Kondor (Central European University) 
Michael Devereux (University of British Columbia) 
Valerie Ramey (University of California, San Diego)
Javier Ferri (Universidad de Valencia) 
Ricardo Nunes (Federal Reserve Board)
Simon Wren-Lewis (Oxford University)
Andrew Rose (University of California, Berkeley)
John Boyd (University of Minnesota)
José Fillat (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston)
		 The seminars normally take place every Wednesday 
from 12:30 to 13:30 and are accompanied by a small 
lunch for the participants. The seminars are “by 
invitation only” and enjoy a special recognition in the 
Frankfurt community. For inquiries, please contact JLS 
Coordinator Celia Wieland at JLS@ifk-cfs.de.
Celebrating 10 Years of the Joint Lunchtime SeminarAon Versicherungsmakler Deutschland GmbH, Frankfurt; Bank of Japan, Frankfurt; Barclays Bank Plc, Frankfurt; BDO Deutsche 
Warentreuhand AG, Frankfurt; Berenberg Bank, Hamburg; BHF-BANK Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt; Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V., 
Berlin; Degussa Bank GmbH, Frankfurt; Delbrück Bethmann Maffei AG, Frankfurt; Deutsche Postbank AG, Bonn; Die Sparkasse Bremen AG, 
Bremen; Ernst & Young GmbH, Eschborn; Frankfurter Volksbank eG, Frankfurt; Franz Haniel & Cie. GmbH, Duisburg; Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, Frankfurt; Fritz Knapp Verlag, Frankfurt; Hauck & Aufhäuser Privatbankiers KGaA, Frankfurt; HeidelbergCement AG, Heidelberg; 
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG, Düsseldorf; IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, Düsseldorf; infoscore Forderungsmanagement GmbH, Baden-
Baden; KfW Bankengruppe, Frankfurt; KPMG AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, Frankfurt; Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank, Frankfurt; 
Maleki Communications GmbH, Frankfurt; Maple Bank GmbH, Frankfurt; McKinsey & Company, Inc., Düsseldorf; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 
LLP, Frankfurt; PricewaterhouseCoopers AG, Frankfurt; Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. KGaA, Köln; SEB AG, Frankfurt; UBS Deutschland 
AG, Frankfurt; Union Asset Management Holding AG, Frankfurt; Versicherungskammer Bayern, München; VICTORIA Versicherung AG, 
Düsseldorf; Westdeutsche ImmobilienBank, Mainz; WM Gruppe, Frankfurt.
Franz Amesberger; Raimund Bär; Dr. Andreas Bascha; Martin Bloch; Prof. Alexander Dürr; Dr. Bettina Eisenächer; Dr. Robert E. Fiedler; 
Dr. Rüdiger Ginsberg; Peter Karamboikis; Christoph Martin Klein; Thomas Krahnen; Dr. Matthias Larisch; Bernd Mack; Andre P.H. Müller; 
Karsten Rixecker; Dr. Christian Schiller; Dr. Michael Schüllermann; Thomas Seidel; Bledar Striniqi; Dr. Uwe Vielmeyer; Dietmar Vogelsang; 
Dr. Markus Warncke; Martin Wilhelm; Dr. Peter Wilke; Antonios Zairis; Dr. Jens Zinke.
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